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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
S'rATJ<~

OF UT AH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.
10900

vs.
PE~TER

A. PETERSON,
Dr'f endnnt-Apve,llant.

BRIEF OF

APPI<~LLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Peter A. Peterson, was charged with
the crime of Assault with a Deadly Weapon with Intent
to Inflict Great Bodily Injury.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
To the charge, the appellant entered a plea of not
guilty. Upon a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted
of the Crime of Assault with a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Inflict Great Bodily Injnry and sentenced to the
indderrninate term in the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction, or
. '
in the alternative a reduction of the conviction to simple
assault.

STAT1'JJ\fEN'T' OF THE FACTS
On the 20th day of October, 196G, Keith :Magnnson
met Linda Skelton in 'West Second So nth A rPa of Salt
Lake City. After some preliminary negotiations, thc)proceeded to her motel room in Seagull Motel, 325 North
Sc~cond \Y 0st. After they arrived, l\Ir. Magnuson rvmond
his clothing and l\fiss Skelton removed part of hers (Tr.
14-15). At this point there was apparently some disagreement regarding Mr. Magnuson's efforts to kiss :Miss Skdton (Tr. 15). Miss Skelton testified Mr. Magnuson tried
to choke her (Tr. 44). At this point, tlw appellant entered the Motel. Miss Skelton yelled "Pete" and the
appellant came to the bedroom. He looked in and returned with a knife (Tr. 16, 4G). He walked into the
room and stopped in front of l\f r. l\Iagnuson. l\Ir. Magnuson put his hand out. Then, either through a motion
of l\fr. Magnuson ('rr. 47) or the appellant (Tr. lG),
Mr. l\ragnuson \Vas eut on the hand. l\f r. l\fagnu;.;on th<m
got dressed and left.
The State prc'srnted its cas<\ in chief with tlte testimony of jnst one witn0ss, Keith 1fag1111son. A ftpr the
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state rested its case, the appellant called as a witness
Linda Skelton, and then the appellant testified on his
mm hPhalf.
TIH· State then called as rebuttal witnesses Fern
Donglwrty, the manager of the motel wherein the altercation took 1ilace, and Dale Elton, a police officer. Both
si(l('s t ]H·n rPste<l.

The jury was tlwn instructed an<l given three posverdicts: Guilty of Assault with a Deadly Weapon
\l·itl1 lntent to do Bodily Harm; Guilty of Assault; or
Xot Guilty. The jnry returned "'ith a wrdict of Guilty
of Assault with a Deadly Weapon with Intent to do Great
Bodily Harm. The appellant was sentenced to the indeterminated term as provided by law in the Utah State
Prison.
~ihle

ARGUMEWI'
POTNT I
THF, FACTS FAILED TO SUSTAIN A FINDlNU OF GUILTY AS A -MATTER OF LA \V.
ThP app<·llant submits that as a matt(•r of law the
fads wonld not snstain a finding of guilty. If we accept

tl1P ·wrsion of thP facts most fa\'orablP to the State, the
:lpp1·l l:1nt em1fro11h·d tlil' emnpluining witnt>ss with a }nmt-
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ing knife and when the complaining witness extended hi~
hand, the appellant mad<> a "slashing" motion which n
sulted in a small cut on the complaining witnesses hand.
'l111e appellant then ld't the room and returned telling
the complaining witness lw wonld giv(' him " ... lialf :1
srcond to get the G.D. out of there" (Tr. 17). It is elPai
from the S(~q1wnce of P\"Pnts that the sole motive of tl1\·
amwllant wns to cm~s<' ~l r. ?\f ag-nuson to leave the motPi
l'OOlll.

The very essence of the crime with whid1 tlw ap1)\'I
lant was convicted is the intent to inflict gn•at bodily
injury. State 11• Potcllo, 42 Utah 39G, 132 Pac. 14 (1913):
State v. Barkas, 91 Utah :174, 65 P.2d 1130 (JD:]i).
Threatening a lH-'rson with a d<'a<ll.'· wt•apon with tl1i:
intention of frightening or intimidating him is a simple
assault but does not constitute Assault with a Deadly
Weapon with Intent to Inflict Bodily Injury. Barkas.
s117Jra at 91 Utah 579.
The intent to inflict injury rnnst lw a specific intt>nt.
The Snpr<•rne Court of Colorado in Shrcrc 1:. Peo1Jic.
292 P.2 1020; 12G Colorado 41:3; <l.Pfined sud1 s1wcit'ic
int<'nt at pagP 102:3.
Specific~ as applied to inknt to do ,!.~Teat hmlily harm, and \\'hieh must lw found as a l'aet lwfore

conviction ' is an adJ.!'C'tive
wl1ic-l1 ffo;ti11gui~;JiL·s tlJI'
.
intPnt to do hun•at hodilY• harm f'rom otlwr intentions in the appellant's rnirnl at tlH· ti11l<' nl' tlll'
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co1mnission of the crime, and to require the intention to he in actual existence in appellant's mind
at tlw time of the commission of the alleged crime.
rl'lw h•stimony of both Miss Skelton and the appel1wt would lea\'e no doubt that the sole motive of the
apfH'llant was to have }.fr. Magnuson leave. Even accordirw,'
to the victim's testimonv
'
. there is no indication of anv.
i11tPnt to inflict great bodily injury. ('l1r. 15-16, 20-21).
Th.- rnt suff<>n'd by l\f r. 1\Iagnuson was the accidental
t<·,;nlt of the appellant's att<~mpt:s to intimidate Mr. Magnnson. AJJ]Wllant submits, ho-w<·ver, that the mere at1<·,npt to intimidate when not coupled with the intent
to C'anse bodily harm does not constitute the crime
('liarg<•d.
It is significant that the appellant withdrew from
the room following the alleged asault. The fact that he
did not pnrsue an aggressive course of action reinforces
tl1P notion that hi:s motive was not to cause harm to 11-r.
J!agnuson, lmt merely to eanse him to leave.
'rlw situation that the appellant found himself m
\\"Us tlw n•sult of a reqm•st by Miss Skelton. The jnry
11111st hav<' intl'rpreted tlw <•venh; that occured with prejudice Jw· to the n•ason for the eomplaining witnesses
!wing ill :Miss ~hlton's bedroom and the implications
tl1at eoulcl ]H' drawn tlwrdrorn. How<•ver, tlte facts fail
IP :-l1m"· tllat ll11· app<'llant \\'as attt>rnpting to do anything
111•1r1• tit<u1 1'.i<'d the eo111plaining witness from Miss Skel-
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ton's room at her requeP;t. The state did not show an:v
complicity between the two.
In a case snch as this, it is difficult for dcfrnsr
counsel to cope with the inferences that may be drawn
from snrronnding circumstances, hnt that are not s11stain0d by the facts. It is also difficult for the jury to
make an Hnhiased decision.

~Iiss

f-ik('lton's apptuPnt prn-

fession, or avocation as the cas<' may lw, wonlcl tend to
put the appellant's actions in defending hd· ill a [('ss tlian
favorable light. Yet there is no evicknc<> that l1is actions
·were anything more than a respons<:> to lwr rt>cpwsL Had
she been a more respectable person in more res1wctahl<'
circumstances. tht-> jury ·would most lihly have acqnitkd
the defendant. In a time when people avoid involvement
and shirk fron. the defem:P of othns, the d<•frndant did
p;0t involved ... to his own ddrinwnt.
Ddc•nclants snhmits that for these reasons th<• jnry
rendc•red a verdict that cannot hl· snstainPcl by the law.
The act nself, a small motion causing a cnt on tlH• eorn1Jlaining witnesses hand: the snhs<><pwnt witlidrawal of
the dt>fendant 10avinp; the complaining ·witnPss to l<'aYe
·withont further tronhl<': all dmw in n•spons(' to Miss
Sk<>ltnn who was ap1nu·<·ntl:-· in distn·ss; thPsP facts
not s11Hiei<'nt to :-mstain a findinp; ol' guilt:•-

W<'l'l'
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CONCLUSION
Because of a lack of evidence to support a finding of
an inknt to inflict bodily harm, the conviction should be
n·verst>d, or in the alternative, reduced to simple assault.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD SHEPHERD
231 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant

